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UNDERSTANDING IN PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 
., 
This paper is concerned with how we can understand other philosophies. 
My method is first to offer an analysis of an aspeot of African thought. 
Then I shall use that analysis as a vehicle for discussing some 
theoretical and methodological problems in the study of other thought 
systems. especially problems raised by Peter Winch. 
I 
A puzzling feature of African thought is that general propositions 
seem seldom to be evaluated in the light of contrary empirical eVidence. 
If events do not proceed according to expectations stemming from general 
beliefs. Afrioans do not on this basis question the validity of those 
beUefs. Instead. they produce Itsecondary elaborations" (Horton 1967: 
167~) : rationalizations accounting for the divergence between events 
and expectations in particular circumstances while leaving the general 
belief or ass4mption which produced the expectation intact. 
Horton (1967)· treats this phenomenon as a general characteristic 
of African traditional thought. To list a few examples. Dinka do not 
ponder the efficacy of sacrifice in general becaus,e particular sacrifices 
are not followed by the deSired events. One explanation for failure is 
that DiVinity refused to respond to that particular sacrifice. Another 
is that the specific Power responsible for the difficulty which the 
sacrifice aimed to remove was wrongly identified. rendering the sacrifice 
ineffective because misdirected (Lienhardt 1961: 291). This character­
istic of African thought is copiously dooumented for the'Azande. That 
a man admits he maybe a Witch although he does not act with malicious 
irttent nor in concert with other witches does not shake his belief that 
witches do act in these ways. It only leads him to conclude that he is 
nqt an ordinary witoh (Evans-Pritchard 1937: 119-20). If a witch­
dootor fails in his cure the explanation maybe that this particular 
witchdoctor is a fraud. but never that witchdoctors in general have no 
power (Evans-Pritohard 1937: 19'). Failure of oracles may be attribu­
ted to causes, like corruption of the poison by Witchcraft or mere hunger 
of the termites rather than attendance to the questions put to them; 
the poesibility that oracles in general are futile is never raised (Evans.. 
Prito'hard 1937: 337-41). 
~ question. then. is: Why do Africans refrain from questioning 
their g~l beliefs in the light '01' contrary evidence? Speaking 
speaificaJiy of the Az8.ncle. Evans;'Pritchard argues that they do not do 
so bt3cause their thought is a closed system which accounts for its own 
failures. ' 
Azande see as well as we that the failure of their oracle
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In his book on the Azande Evans-Pritchard takes the position that 
Zande notions apout Witchcraft, magic and oracles are Itmysticallr , that 
they are not in accord with objective reality as this is apprehended 
by the observations and logic of scientific thought (1937: 12, 476-78, 
494). Winch criticizes this approach. maintaining that concepts of 
reality are themselves given in language and culture, and therefore that 
no culture-free concept of objective reality can exist. We thus have 
the options of viewing another system of thought in terms of our concepts 
of reality or in terms of its own concepts of reality. Winch insists on 
the latter course, and for that reason finds Evans-Pritchard's later 
analysis of Nuer religion (1956) preferable to his treatment of Zande 
thought (Winch 1964: 3W-15). 
Much of the next section will be devoted to a critique of Winch's 
ideas. Here, however, I wish to point out what strikes me as an 
advantage in the approach he advocates. If we do evaluate another 
philosophy, it is likely that we will find a great deal of error in the 
alien philosophy. We may then be led to wonder how that philosophy can 
persist when much of it is wrong, and our analysis may bean attempt to 
answer this question. l Consider Robin Horton's answer to the question 
raised in this paper. He argues that traditional African thought 
systems admit no alternatives to their basic theories and postulates. 
The African either believes that the world is ordered as his received 
philosophy fiays it is, or he must believe that the world is not ordered 
at all. Therefore, the African does not question his basic assumptions 
in the light of contrary evidence because of his anxiety that, were those 
assumptions found false, he would be driven to. the psychologically 
unsettling conclusion that the' world is chaotic (Horton 1967 t 167-69). 
One may read Horton's analysis as taking it for granted that to 
assess general beliefs gccording to empirical experience is a natural or 
proper epistemological procedure for all men, and that Africans would 
employ it if only their lack of alternative theories did not prevent them 
from doing so with psychological security. Adopting Winch's prescript­
ion of viewing a philosophy in its own terms, one's attention would be 
directed to precisely those things which Horton appears to take for 
granted. Instead of wondering how the failure to assess general 
beliefs in the light of contrary evidence can persist in African thought, 
one would ask what it is about African ontology and epistemology which 
renders it unnecessary or irrational within that system of thought to 
evaluate beliefs in this way. The analysis I offer attempts to answer 
this question. 
I think we will be in the best position to understand why Africans 
do not evaluate their general beliefs in the light of empirical evidence 
if we first consider Why we of the West often do evaluate our beliefs 
in this way. My point can be made most cleariY' on the basis of that 
part of Western thought in which this mode of evaluation is most 
rigorously developed, so this brief disoussion of the West will be. 
limited to natural science. In science, the procedure of evaluating 
beliefs (or assumptions or theories) according to empirical evidence is 
the experimental method. This method rests, I think, on two basic 
postulates of Western metaphysics - postUlates seen perhaps most clearly 
in CompteanPositive philosophy. The first is that empirical events are 
subject to unseen principles or laws; the second is that these principles 
or laws operate with mechanical regularity. In our epistemology, the 
first postUlate leads us to think that empirical events are relevant to 
our knowledge of the unseen principles or laws. 
The second postulate assures us that empirical events are a reliable 
means of evaluating our assumptions or theories about those principles 
or laws. The postulate that the laws of nature operate with mechanical 
regularity is essential to the. experimental method.. It assures us that 
variables can be controlled in an experiment: that some iaws will not 
operate, or at least will not operate in an unpredictable fashion, in 
the experiment. And this assurance in turn is necessary if we are to 















whose operation that experiment was desisnedto reveal. Unless these, 
oriteria are met, it is irrational to think that the experimental-method 
could· be utilized tQ evaluate our theories about any law of nature. 
With oertain modifioations, our first Western postulate - that 
empirioal events are subject to unseen prinoiples'or laws - would appear 
to be valid also for Afrioah metaphysics. The word "law" is espeoially 
inappropriate for Afrioan thought. Let us adopt Father Tempels' wording 
and rephrase the postulate'to read "empirical events are sUbJeot to 
unseen foroes or powers". Among these foroes or powers are what have 
been termed, Spirit and refractions of Spirit' for the Nuer, (Evans-Pritchard 
1956), Divinity and divinities for the Dinka (Uenhardt 1961), ghosts, and 
witohoraft for the Anuak (Lienhardt 1962),. witohoraft, oracles, and magic 
for the Azande (Evans-Pritcbard 1937), the Supreme Being, and ancestors, 
men, and literally all being for the Baluba (Tempels 1945). ,certainly 
there are many differenoes between these concepts, but they are not 
important for the very general point I wish to make: that all of these 
things, in the African view, are forces whioh may influence events in 
the world. 
But oomparing African _thou/Ylt with our second Western postulate we 
find a sharp differenoe. Africans do not think that these forces act 
with mechanioal regularity, Many ,of them are thought to have volition, 
. as is seen in the Dinka idea that Divinity mayor may no,t respond to a 
partioular sacrifice (Lienhardt 1961: 291). In Baluba philosophy the 
forces are intimately interconnected so that the operation of one force 
depends on a great many others. On a particular occasion a given force 
may remain inactive or may act in 801 ofa number. of ways and with any 
of a: number of results, depending on the disposition of a multitude of 
variables (other forces) on that occasion (Tempels '1945: 40-1, 57, 87-89). 
Zande oracles (Evans-Pritchard 1937) revealolearly the idea' of the 
irregular aotion of foroes, and show how Africans use this concept in a 
positive way., The Azancle administer poison to a fowl, asking the poison 
to kill the fowl if a certain statement (e.g. a prediotion e,>f the future 
or the oause of an illness or death) is true. Then they ask the oracle 
to confirm its answer by sparing a second fowl if the first one died, or 
_ by killing the second. if the first survived. Essentially this is an 
experiment, run tWice, with the aim of confirming a "hypothesis" - that 
hypothesis being the prediotion or other statement put to the oracle. 
The interesting thing is that the Azande accept the hypothesis, as proven 
or disproven' only if the experiment has different results eaoh time it 
is run - if one fowl dies and, the other survives. This procedure is ' 
completely unintelligible in Western scientific thought, Where an 
experiment is valid for oonfirming or disproving a hypothesis only if 
the result is the ~ each time the experiment is run. 
, 'l'lie Azande think that the poison laoks pOtency in itself, that the 
potenc,y emerges only when a question is put j;o the oracle (Evans-Pritchard 
1937: '315). It' thus appears that the Azande oonoeive of the poison 
oracle much as the Baluba conceive of medicinal plants. Their curing 
power does not operate automatically; it mayor may not act depending on 
the state of a number of forces external to the plants themselves 
,~,	 (Tempels 1945: 62-}). For the zande poison oracle, the main external 
foroe which stimulates the poison to kill or to spare is the truth or 
falsity of the "hypothesisII put to it. Here is a case where Afrioans 
utilize their conception of the irregularity of the forces of nature to 
regulate their lives. They oonstruct an experimental situation where 
a foroe is asked to aot irregularly (killing one fowl, sparing another) 
and they endow the particular form of irregularity (which fowl was 
killed, and which spared?) with meaning. And, of oO'UrSe, given their 
assumption that the forces of nature do act irregularly and under .the 
influence of many other forces, if an apparently valid oracular prediction 
fails to materialize, it is logical to suppose that some other foroe, 
such as witchcraft, influenced the oracle. 
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fundamentally different from Western science. r have suggested that~ 
for Africans~ the forces of nature are not thought to act regularly 
because the action of any force is influenced by many other forces. But 
this could be taken to mean simply that Africans consider a great many 
variables to impinge upon events~ and that what I have called their concep­
tion of the irregular action of the forces of nature is nothing more than 
their recognition that they do not fully understand all the variables 
affecting any particular event. From. this point of view one might 
attribute to them the ideas that the forces of nature do act with mechanical 
regularity and that they could predict the events resulting from their 
operation if only they coiii'd"Control all the variables. In this view the 
Africans emerge as possessing a scientific mentality but without enough 
knowledge to take it very far. 
The problem with this position is that~ given our idea that the laws 
of nature operate with mechanical regularity~ when we talk about "controlling 
variables" we mean the ability to predict if and how variables will act 
in particular circumstances. Such prediction is~ I think~ impossible in 
African thought. The variables we are discussing are the forces of nature~ 
and most of them (the Supreme Being~ nature sprites~ witches~ ghosts~ etc.) 
have volition. Therefore~ the African has no way of predicting if they 
will act in a particular situation. Neither are they conceived with the 
functional specificity that characterizes variables in the Western view. 
There are many ways~ for example~in which a witch or malevolent ghost 
can do mischief. Therefore~ even if the African conception of variables 
(forces) would allow them to predict that certain variables will act in a 
particular situation~ that conception renders it impossible to predict 
how they will act. Therefore~ I maintain that the postulate that the 
fOrces of nature do not operate with mechanical regularity is validly 
attributable to Afrioan thought. 2 Their ontological charaoter 
(especially volition and functional diffuseness) is incompatible with 
any idea of pred1ctable~ mechani~l regularity of action. 
My answer to the quee~1on of why Africans do not question their 
general beliefs on the basis of contrary evidence should now be clear. 
General beliefs or assumptions can be evaluated in terms of empirical 
experience only if one is certain that the experience is relevant to the 
assumption~ that no other factors oontributed to the course of the 
experience beyond those embodied in the belief or assumption. The 
variables affecting the experience must be controlled. But the 
African postulate that the forces of nature do not operate in a 
mechanically regular way means that in their view the variables 
affecting experience cannot be controlled. They canno~ rationally 
attribute a given event to a given force because they cannot be certain 
if that force in fact operated on that· occasion. Nor can they be 
certain if (and if so~ how) the outcome was affected by the action of 
other forces. Therefore~ I suggest that Africans do not question their 
general beliefs -in the light of contrary evidence· because~ ~ithin their 
system of thought~ this is not rational. From their metaphysical point 
of view such evaluation cannot. be a reliable epistemological procedure~ 
II 
Having offered the preceding analysis of an aspect of African thought, 
I should now like to view that analysis as data against which we may 
consider some problems in the study of other philosophies. 
Peter Winch would have us understand another culture or historical 
period in its own terms. As I understand his reasoning in its relevance 
to anthropology~ a people's thought and behaviour a~e intelligible only 
in terms of the concepts of reality held by that people. These concepts 
of reality are given in language and in the "form of lifel' in general. 
Since languages and "forms of life" vary~ concepts of reality and the 
resulting modes of apprehending meaning in ideas and behaviour also vary. 
Further~ since there can be no· concepts apart from a language and a 
"form of life"~ there is no common denominator in terms of which differ­
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Each "form of 11fe"l with its language l phllosophyl and system of social 
relations is a self-contained entity which can be understood only in its 
own terms (Winch 19581 see especially pp. 11-151 22.231 40-441 121-133). 
I must confess uncertainty as to exactly how far Winch wishes to 
press the point that a culture must be understood in its own terms. The 
train of logic summarized above and many' of his remarks (e.g. 1958: 
129-32) imply that we'''llIU,S't strive, to approach I as closely as possible I 
the goal of understanding as the native understands. But MacIntyre 
(19(7) interprets Winch as arguing that understanding from within is 
just a starting point for analysis I and Winch t s statement (1964: 319) 
that lithe sort of understanding we seek requires that we see the Zande 
categol"J in relation to our own already understood categories" lends 
credence to this point. Whichever Winch espouses l he has not to,my 
knowledge given close consideration to the problems involved in under­
standing another culture in its own terms. These are the problems 
which I propose to discuss here. 
My analysis of why Africans do not question their general beliefs on 
the basis of contrary evidence may appear to qualify as an example of 
understanding another culture in its own terms. There was no 
evaluation of the validity of African concepts from a Western point of 
'view. Nor was African thought referred to as a "closed system" or as 
"lacking alternatives"l and both of these characterizations imply an 
external perspective. Insteadl the analysis considered the problem 
in terms of concepts of, reality attributed to the Africans I and 
concluded that within these concepts such a uDde of evaluating beliefs 
would not be rational. Yet I do not claim that this analysis provides 
unders~anding of African thought in its own terms; still less do I 
claim that in thinking through the conclusions' of this analysis we are 
thinking like Africans think. I doubt that either of these claims 
is true l for a number of reasons. 
First l since concepts of reality and intelligibility are imbedded 
in language and a "form of life" I understanding a philosophy in its own 
terms presupposes int1m8:t~ knOWledge of the language and culture. 
Hence the analysis offered above ,is disqualified at the outset l for I 
know no African language I have never studied first-hand an African 
society I am in no Sense an Africanist and have never even been to Africa. 
noubtless an anthropologist with all these qualifications could devise 
~n analysis of our problem superior to the one I have offered. But 
'one wonders if even his analysis would represent understanding of 
African philosophy in its own terms. Would not the fact that he of 
necessity learned that philosophy in terms of his own culture's 
philosophy while the natives learned it from infancy mean that he must 
understand it differently than they do? And are there any criterial 
beyond intuitionl by which he could know that he understands it as the 
natives do? Even if he could gain SU'C'h understanding I and could know 
he has itl surely it is incommunicable to anyone who lacks the language 
and first-hand contact I since when he tries ',to explain it in another 
language and according to different concepts of reality it is clearly 
not being treated in its own terms. 
SecondlYI if we are to Understand another philosophy entirely in 
its- own terms l we should be limited to thinking only about those 
problems which arise within that philosophy. This would bar us from 
askingl among many others I the question raised in this paper. If it 
does not occur to the African to question his general beliefs on the 
basis of contrary -evidenoe-.---it -- is,diffioult to imagine him wrestling 
with the problem of ~ he does not. Clearly the. question emerges 
when African thought is viewed from the perspective of Western thought. 
We of the West often do question our general beliefs in this manner I 
and it is preoisely the-differenoe we perceive between ourselves and 
Africans which leads' us to ask this question and to be interested in its 
answer. 3 Moreoverl our analysis concerns not all of Afrioan thought 
but a class of it: the class manifested in cases where general beliefs 
are not questioned on the basis of contrary evidence. But I have 
just argued that the observation that general beliefs are not questioned 
in this way stems from Western thought rather than African thought. 
-
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Were we viewing African thought in its own terms l we would not be 
justified in thinking that those cases form a class at all. There 
would probably be no conunon charaot.eristic which relates them and 
sets them off from other aspects of thOUght; certainly not the 
characteristic we have recognized. Thus even before it gets started I 
at the point of framing the problem~ the analysis offered here cannot 
be a study of African thought in its own terms. 
Furthermore l a comparative perspective has chaPaoterized my entire 
analJ~is. I found it easiest to think about whi'Africans do not 
eval~'"te their assumptions on the basis of empirical evidence by 
thtnking first about why Western scientists do. 1'ItY analysis proceeded 
from a pair of postulates which I think are attributable to African 
philosophyl but these postulates were introduced and discussed in 
contrast with their opposite numbers from the West. The same method 
of contrasts was followed in the discussion of how experiments could 
be r~n and variables controlled in terms of the Western and African 
post1 lates. The very concepts "experiment" and "variable" I crucial to 
my a1'1alysis l were of course derived from Western rather than African 
thought. Considering all this l the analysis I have offered must be 
very remote from understanding African philosophy in its own terms. 
The most important reason I have for why my analysis does not 
reveal African philosophy in its own terms is that the epistemological 
structure of that analysis itself is Western rather than African. 
MY aim was to explain Why Africans do not evaluate their general 
beliefs according to contrary -evidenoel and my meth()d of explanation was 
to posit two postulates of African philosophy andl by reasoning from 
those postulates I to argue that it is not rational within African 
philosophy to evaluate general beliefs in this way. This method itself 
stems from Western philosophy. It is based on the first Western 
postulate I offered ~ that empirical events are subject to unseen 
principles or laws. In this case the "empirical events" are observa­
tions that Africans do not evaluate their general beliefs according to 
contrary evidence. The "unseen principles or laws" are the two 
postulates I posited for African philosophy. In Western thought the 
epistemological correlate to the postulate that empirical events are 
subject to unseen principles or laws is that empirical events are 
intelligible in terms of those principles or laws. By explaining 
African thought in terms of my two postulates of African philosophy I my 
analysis has followed this directive of W~stern epistemology; it is 
Western rather than African in structure. - . 
Moreoverl the notion of intelligibility which underlies my analysis 
is Western and not African. When I conceived of analyZing our problem 
in terms of the two postulates I have posited for African philosophyl 
I evaluated those postUlates by asking "Do they work?" In carrying 
out this evaluation I Juxtaposed the postUlates against various 
particular cases where Africans do not question their general beliefs 
in terms of contrary evidence I and determined whether each of those 
cases could be understood in terms of the postulates. In such an 
evaluationl each case which can be so understood oonstitutes "proof" 
or supporting evidence for the postulates I while cases which could not 
be understood in terms of the postulates would disprove them and 
therefore would necessitate revision or dismissal of the postulates. 
Furthermore l I think a critic would evaluate my analysis and its 
postulates of Afrioan philosophy in precisely the same way. Although 
not attaining the rigor found in natural sciencel this mode of 
evaluation is essentially the experimental method. It stems from the 
second Western postulate mentioned earlier: that unseen principles or 
laws act with mechanical regularity. In my analysis the postulates of 
African philosophy represent "unseen principles or laws" 'of African 
thought. It is rational for us to insist that they render eve!:: 
relevant case intelligible only if we first assume that those 
principles or laws operate with mechanical regularity. Therefore l the 
way in which both I and a critic ju~e whether or not my analysis makes 
the African thought in question intelligible is a Western way, And 












































is !lOt an African way. For it will be recalled that the very problem 
we set out to explain is why Africans do not evaluate general beliefs 
on the basis of contrary eVidence, i.e., why db Africans not think 
experimentally? Since both I and a critic understand my analysis and 
the African thought it treats aaaording to notions of intelligibility 
quite alien to African thought, it clearly cannot be said that this 
analysis provides understanding of African thought in its own terms. 
And I think that this point holds with equal force for any analysis we 
make of another philosophy. 
To sum up. when we seek to .understand. another system of thought, not 
one but two philosophies are in 'play. There is of course native 
philosophy, since it, is the natives who do the thinking we wish to 
understand. But our own philosophy is intrinsically involved as well, 
since it is we who do the understanding. Understanding itself varies 
among cultures. Northrop has devoted a great deal of hard thought to 
this point (1946, 1960, 1964), and a few differences between Western and 
African epistemologies (such as the role of experimental thinking in 
understanding) have been discussed in this paper.' (See also TempeIs 
1945 for a discussion of African epistemology.) ,When we understand. 
another philosophy, then, we understand it acco~ng to what properly 
constitutes understanding for us. Very likely this would not qualify as 
understanding from the native point of View, nor would the native's " 
understanding of his own philosophy count as proper understanding forus.5 
Therefore, I think it is extremely unlikely - if not impossible .. that we 
could ever understand another philosophy in its own terms. This would 
require, operating entirely within the metaphysical and epistemological 
concepts and procedures of that philosophy, while I maintain that another 
philosophy, like everything else in the universe, can be intelligible to 
us only in terms of our own metaphysics and. epistemology" 
/-(Curiously, my reasoning here is very close to that of Winch, and 
yet we end up at opposite poles. I agree with his point that a people's 
ideas and behavior are intelligible only in terms of their concepts of 
reality. But I think that the logic requires another step: since we 
are people too, another CUlture's concepts of reality are intelligible 
to us only in terms of our own concepts of reality.)1 
From this point of view, any analysis we make must have an "as if" 
quality about it. I do not mean to suggest in this paper, for example, 
that Afrioans subscribe either consciously, unconsciously, implicitly or 
in any other way to the postulates that empirical events are SUbject to 
unseen forces, and that these forces do not aot With meohanical 
regularity. I do suggest, however, that oertain puzzling aspects of 
African thought become intelligible to us if we regard the Africans 
as if they subsoribed to these postulates. This is similar to the 
procedures of natural science. Horton has pOinted out that scientific 
theories are often constructed on the model of familiar phenomena, as for 
example the planetary theory of the atom (Horton 1964:98. 1967:67-8). 
Now the thoughtful scientist would not say that atoms really are 
constructed like the solar system, but only that a number of things about 
atoms become intelligible to us when we view them as if they were (see 
Northrop 1946: 194). 
This leads to my final point. Winch argues that understanding in 
social science is different from understanding in natural science, and 
that therefore social scientists should not attempt to operate like 
natural scientists (1958:1-2, 127-28, 132-33). His main points seem 
to be that intelligibility in naturalsc1ence 'depends on theory. that 
natural phenomena can meaningfully be said to be related only in terms 
of the theory which posits that relationship. One cannot understand 
the relationship without first understanding the theory. In contrast, 
social phenomena are intelligible only in terms of the language and 
culture in whioh they exist. Their relationships must be underst90d 
from within. Therefore one cannot understand social theories or laws 
without a prior understanding of the social situations to which they 
apply (Winch 1958: 133-36). . , 
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The burden of this paper has been that we cannot understand social 
situations (other than those 1n which we participate as thoughtful 
natives) frour-1d-thin.r----.In--my--view, we understand them very much as 
Winch describes understanding in natural science. Winch argues that 
in natural science understanding of a theory preoedes understanding of 
the phenomena explained by that theory, while social phenomena must be 
understood 1n themselves before we can understand theories purporting 
to explain them. But consider once again the analysis of African ~ 
thought offered in this paper. We began with a characteristic of 
African thought which was unintelligible to us. We explained it in 
terms of a theory: two postulates and certain deductions from them. 
Contra Winch, I do not think that one need understand the elements of 
African thought this theory p~orts to explain before one can understand 
the theory. (Indeed, I do not think he can understand those elements 
- of thought apart !!:.2!!!. the theory. or some other theory). To be sure, 
I devised_ the theory while puzzling over those aspects of African thought. 
just as a natural scientist builds theory not in a vacuum but with 
reference to problems. But I see no reason why someone else of the 
West could not grasp the postulates I advanced for African thought and 
my reasoning from them, even if he had never heard of Dinka sacrifice 
or zande oracles or the rest of it. . 
Another facet of Winch's point is that in natural science connections
 
between phenomena are intelligible only in terms of theory. while
 
connections between social pheno~ena are given in the social situation
 
in which those phenomena exist. But our analysis advanoed a connection
 
between the African practice of not questioning general beliefs on the
 
basis of contrary evidence and Zande thought with reference to the normal
 
and prOper operation of oraoles (see pp. 5-6 above). Again contra
 
Winch. I submit that this connection is not "given" in the social
 
situation. Rather, as Winch says with reference to intelligibility in
 
natural science, "It is only !a terms 2!. 2 theory that one can speak
 
of the events being thus 'connected i ••• ; the only way to grasp the
 
connection is to learn the theory" (1958: 134. Winch's emphasis).
 
Finally, I have argued that we do not understand other cultures
 
in their own terms, but according to what for us constitutes proper
 
understanding. This mode of understanding itself is a theory - a
 
theory of knowledge or an epistemology. I do not think our analyses
 
of social phenomena are likely to be intelligible to anyone who does
 
not have a prior familiarity with that epistemology. Within our
 
epistemology, which Northrop (1964) has termed "logical realism",
 
puzzling observable phenomena are made intelligible by viewing them as
 
if they conform to invariable principles or laws which we devise and
 
label "theories". We then Judge a theory experimentally: by
 
determining whether other observable phenomena which fall within the
 
domain of the theory also behave as if they conform to the principles
 
or laws it ~stulates. AlthOUgh there are olearly differences in rigor
 
of experimentation, I submit that this means of understanding character­

izes the social sciences as much as the natural scienoes.
 
F. Allan Hanson. 
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regularity cannot be attributed to African philosophy. However I 
beg leave to continue with the former formulation, as this seems 
to give me something more tangible to work with as I construct my 
analysis and (in Section II) as I analyse.:that analysis. 
3.	 It may be protested that I have phrased the question ethnocentri ­
cally, and that it could properly ·beaskedwithin the context of 
African philosophy in the neutral form "What·· is the relation 
between general propositions and particular events?" I agree 
that the question is better stated in this form, as the analysis 
above demonstrates. Bu~ I maintain the point that we are led to 
ask' even this question because the relation seems different for 
Africans than it does for ·us. When a Z2ndetells us that his 
foot is cut because he struck it on a rock we do not spin theories 
of Z2nde causation. It is only when he begins' to speculate over 
what witchcraft Caused his foot to strike the rock that we become 
interested. I submit that no matter how. carefully and neutrally 
we frame our questions and pursue our investigations, we always 
conceive of those questions and investigations from the perspective 
of our own thought. It is "difficult to imagine how we could do 
otherwise. 
4.	 . One might argue that since my first African postulate (that 
empirical events are'subJect to unseen powers or forces) is 
similar to the first Western postulate, the method of explanation 
adopted in my analysis may not be totally alien to African thought. 
On the basis of what has been said thus far I agree with this, 
although quite striAing divergences will appear in a moment. At 
any rate, I would maintain that the method of analysis derives 
from Western rather than African philosophy, and that any 
similarity to a possible African method of analysis is due to 
coincidental resemblances between the two philosophies, not to 
the possibility that I have been able to analyze African thought 
in its own terms. 
5.	 This is not to say that we cannot understand what for the native 
constitutes proper understanding. We can and should study native 
epistemology. But our understanding of native epistemology 
will not be the same as the native's understanding of it. To be 
intelligible to us it must be cast in the concepts of Western 
epistemology, not native epistemology. 
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